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Abstract: Do refugee inflows have an effect on state fragility? In this article I examine whether refugee
inflows, commonly associated in the literature with economic and cultural pressures, result in a more
fragile state by means of increased violent group grievance. Violent group grievance captures a distinct
form of intrastate violence, specifically small-scale hate crimes and ethnic group clashes associated with
powerlessness and discrimination. The main hypothesis in this paper is that refugee inflows may increase
violent group grievance.
I examine the effect of refugee inflows on the level of domestic violent group grievance using quantitative
analyses based on original large-N datasets and cross-sectional longitudinal models to fill gaps in the
literature on state fragility. This study controls for alternative explanations and covers the time period
between 2006 and 2014. The analysis results confirm the main hypothesis of this paper.
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1. Introduction
Do refugee inflows have an effect on state fragility? In
this article I examine whether the number of refugees, com-
monly associated in the literature with cultural and economic
pressures in the host country, result in a more fragile state
by means of increased violent group grievance.
Refugees are defined in this study as “individuals forced
to flee their country due to persecution, war, or violence
with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a
particular social group” [1]. According to the Fragile States
Index (FSI), violent group grievance is the “violence existing
between social groups” [2].
Violent group grievance captures a distinct form of in-
trastate violence, specifically hate crimes and ethnic group
clashes associated with powerlessness and discrimination.
In particular, this measure of violence captures “ethnic
clashes” such as hate crimes or intrastate conflicts at-
tributable to discrimination. My main hypothesis in this
paper is that as the number of refugees increases violent
group grievance due to economic and cultural conflict be-
tween refugees and citizens also increases.
I expect the primary participants in this conflict to be
the minority refugee group and citizens (i.e. natives) of the
host country. Other actors such as government officials (e.g.
governing elites, their armed forces, and police) or “external”
participants (e.g. Peace Officers, foreign militaries) may also
intervene in the conflict to prevent persecution or influence
the outcome. In this paper I focus on the conflict by which
citizens violently resist refugees due to shared perceptions
that they may have the most to lose (e.g. job security, cul-
tural integrity, political influence) to refugees. The foundation
of the argument is that refugees increase ethnic diversity
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which in turn may lead to violent group grievance. In con-
trast, refugee absence equates to less ethnic diversity and
thus less violent group grievances, as defined in this article.
By committing violence against the refugees, citizens may
believe they protect their economic security (e.g. employ-
ment opportunities) and assumed dominant national culture
including traditional and religious practices. In short, citizens
may view refugees as an economic and/or cultural threat.
Thus, they may engage in violence over preexisting economic
resources and cultural traditions. The dependent variable pro-
vided by the Fragile States Index involves only measures of
violence such as hate crimes or intrastate conflicts attributable
to ethnic clashes. Further, this study assumes that there is
a ‘dominant’ national culture and tradition in the host state;
it does not account for cases where the incoming refugees
are of the same culture as the host state’s culture or that of
a major group in the state [3]. In this paper, the concept of
“culture” is defined as linguistic, religious, ethnic, and racial el-
ements which individuals often subconsciously use to create
their sociocultural identities. For example, cultural (or even
subcultural) differences could be as overt as religious prac-
tices and appearance (e.g. wearing yarmulke, burka, etc.) or
as subtle as an accent variation of the same language (e.g.
British vs. American English).
I begin with a literature review on the connection be-
tween violent group grievance and the number of refugees.
I then construct a theoretical framework based on eco-
nomic interest theory and social identity theory to examine
the mechanism of the relationship between the number of
refugees and associated pressures (i.e. cultural differences
and competition for resources) and violent group grievance
(i.e. hate crimes and intrastate violence attributable to eth-
nic clashes). I proceed to describe the research design,
data, and methodology to test for these effects. Finally, I
describe the findings of my analysis and conclude.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Intrastate violence can manifest in a multitude of ways rang-
ing from small-scale hate crimes and homicides to mass-
casualty civil war. This literature review focuses solely
on one specific form of unlawful violence: violent group
grievance. Unlike the voluminous literature on civil war, vio-
lent group grievance remains largely understudied, which
is surprising given the increase of intrastate violence since
the Second World War ([4], p. 3). I first discuss existing lit-
erature on the relationship between violent group grievance
and refugees and then proceed to discuss the theoretical
framework of this study that addresses some of the short-
comings in the violent group grievance literature.
2.1. Literature Review
In the literature the connection between violent group
grievance and refugees is understudied. The existing lit-
erature on refugees and violent group grievance is based
mainly on qualitative studies. A review of existing literature
reveals two main findings: the presence of refugees 1) in-
cites violence [5–7] and 2) has a mixed or neutral effect on
violence [8–10].
Rule [5] argues that ethnic violence associated with
refugee presence may be attributable to differences
amongst social groups. These differences can be polit-
ical representation, access to resources, or tolerance of
contrasting cultural practices such as religion or language.
Rule hypothesizes these differences can build to a point of
social frustration within a society that may lead to “violent
action, not often directed against governments after all, but
against members of antagonistic ethnic, racial, or religious
groups” (p. 204). Rule does not address the mechanism
of the connection between social differences and frustra-
tion, but does hypothesize a positive effect of frustration on
violence. He argues the “primary source of the human ca-
pacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression
mechanism. . . If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or
sharply felt, aggression is quite likely [whereby] men who
are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence in
proportion to the intensity of their frustration” ([5], p. 202).
The essence of the theory suggests intergroup frustration
amongst refugees and natives has potential to turn violent
when individuals perceive “indignation or perceived injustice”
([5], p. 202).
To be sure, “frustration” is neither a necessary nor suffi-
cient condition for social conflict.
There are other mediating factors not addressed in
Rule’s analytical framework. To illustrate, there are cases
where individuals of a population suffer, even starve to
death, but still do not engage in violent conflict. An example
would be the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is considered
amongst the most ethnically diverse and politically corrupt
countries annually with over 12 million civilians experienc-
ing starvation (largely attributable to sanctions imposed by
the United States) [11,12]. Members of ten primary ethnic
groups in Iran (e.g. Persians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs,
etc.) experience food poverty and immense repression
from their government yet do not engage in violent conflict
against their government, one another, or refugees. Thus,
other factors may be present under which conflict may or
may not manifest from civil frustration. Group grievances
are also channeled via non-violent group resistance, such
as exclusion of minorities from positions of authority, which
in fact is more prevalent than violent group resistance [6].
However, non-violent group resistance is beyond the scope
of this analysis.
Gurr [13] discusses this frustration-aggression mecha-
nism with reference to relative deprivation. Relative depriva-
tion theory states there are perceived capacities (or value
expectations) which have potential to create social com-
parison and in some cases violence ([13], p. 22). Specifi-
cally, this “destructive behavior [violence] incites as circum-
stances and quality of life change and groups experience a
lack of satisfaction and subsequent frustration” ([13], p. 22).
In this case, for example, natives may blame refugees as if
they perceive diminishing economic wellbeing if resources
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or job opportunities are limited. Thus, natives may compare
their economic resources or perceived economic wellbeing
before and after the arrival of refugees, become frustrated,
and in some cases violently resist.
According to Zolberg et al. [7] rapid, basic transforma-
tion of a society’s state and class structures may lead to
violence attributable to inequality and oppression of “sub-
ordinate classes” including refugees and peasants ([7], p.
245). Zolberg et al. [7] argue minorities are frequently
the victims of small-scale violent conflict because they lack
the resource capacity to flee elsewhere ([7], p. 256–257).
This factor of availability of group resources at the time of
societal changes may condition the relationship in ways
Rule [5] does not take into account. Zolberg et al. did not
systematically test the relationship between radical social
transformation and violence, but they do make a probabilis-
tic argument that rapid social transformation (i.e. effects of
globalization) may lead to ethnic violence where neither
society nor the state is capable of effectively managing
distribution of economic resources, territories, etc. between
natives and refugees ([7], p. 256–257).
The latter findings suggest that refugees may have a
mixed or neutral effect on violent group grievance as argued
by Richmond and Valtonen [10]. Richmond and Valtonen
argue that “state sovereignty can no longer be maintained
in an absolute way... where boundaries are permeable for
money, goods, and information but not for people” ([10],
p. 205). He suggests that economic and developmental
factors condition the effect of the number of refugees on
conflict, which he examines via a qualitative analysis on
“catalysts of social, economic, and political change rooted
in migration pressures” ([10], p. 26). According to Rich-
mond and Valtonen, the presence of refugees often has
a mixed effect on violence depending on whether political
institutions provide economic opportunity and integration
for refugees in the labor market ([10], p. 26). Opportunity in
this context refers to refugee capacity to joining the work-
force as a driving factor of a growing economy. In contrast,
when host countries (such as South Africa in the 1950s) do
not provide aid in terms of social services (e.g. job place-
ment or welfare for the unemployed) conflict may be more
likely ([10], p. 25). Thus, for Richmond and Valtonen an
important factor that may affect the level of violent group
conflict is the state policies aimed at incorporating refugees
in the economy and labor market; in other words the driving
factor in conflict avoidance is the host country’s capacity of
providing economic opportunity.
To my knowledge, there are no systematic studies that
examine directly the relationship between institutional ar-
rangements for economic integration and violence.
Koopmans [11] takes into account political factors that
may explain violent group grievance. He examines Euro-
pean cases from 1988 to 1993 to assess the apparent effect
of the number of refugees on internal violence and voting for
radical parties of the right. Koopmans explores whether or
not the presence of refugees has an effect on violent ethnic
conflict and right wing voting intended to prevent further in-
fluxes of minorities. He presents a theoretical argument on
grievance and opportunity to explain the assumed connec-
tion between radical party voting and violence attributable to
racism. To clarify, he theorizes natives attribute their hard-
ships to refugees and thus violently express grievances
against refugee groups when elected political elites “enable”
(actual or perceived) social justifications for doing so. The
findings show Germany experienced the highest level of
internal violence involving refugees and minority groups
due to a “combination of nationalist rhetoric by established
parties and swift and effective policies restricting the rights
of foreigners and refugees” ([11], p. 211).
A weakness of Koopmans’ study is the lack of specifi-
cation and operationalization of the violence measure. The
author simply refers to this measure as capturing “extreme
right and racist violent actions” ([11], p. 204). In this quan-
titative study, different countries have conflicting definitions
and interpretations of what racist violence may be. For ex-
ample, the “racial violence” measure for Great Britain could
include “threatening behavior or physical attacks” reported
by refugees/native British, whereas the violence measure for
Germany required Volksverhetzung (incitement to racial ha-
tred) influencing an act of violence reported to and involving
police authority ([11], p. 189). Consistent anti-Semitic hate
crimes and small-scale acts of violence are an example of
cases frequently included in Koopmans’ analysis. Further,
Koopmans concludes that results are mixed due to other
intervening factors such as police presence and aspects of
political party and level of democracy. This study presents
an argument for political parties conditioning the effect of the
number of refugees on violent group grievance that is consis-
tent with the expectation described above that in democra-
cies the level of violence may be higher than that in autocratic
regimes. The underlying theory is that democracies permit
grievances to be aired in the form of public demonstrations
that have potential to turn violent, whereas autocracies often
repress such demonstrations from occurring.
More recently, Krcmaric [8] examines social structural
factors by considering why refugee flows may cause conflict
in some host states but not others. He argues “refugees
cause conflict when they alter the host state’s ethnic bal-
ance of power [in their favor]” ([8], p. 182). This ethnic
balance of power refers to the host state’s “ethnic contract...
a bargain that specifies how groups divide benefits in ac-
cordance with the underlying distribution of power” ([8], p.
183). He concludes shifts in relative power may result in
shifts of this ethnic contract for social, political, or resource
benefits and thus subsequently incite violence over these
changes. In short, refugees obtaining political or social
power (by means of elections or otherwise) may experience
an increase in benefits that citizens may perceive as un-
just and use violence to maintain their perceived claim to
existing benefits.
Krcmaric [8] applies theories of bargaining failure and
war to the number of refugees and ethnic violence. Essen-
tially the capacity to negotiate and compromise on territo-
ries, laws, and cultural practices conditions the effect of
15
the relationship between refugee flows and violence. He
examines the case of Serbia’s Kosovo region in 1999 when
“animosity” between ethnic Albanians and native Serbians
escalated rapidly as oppressive policies of Serbian presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic fueled growth of resistance groups
([8], p. 195). After Milosevic launched an ethnic-cleansing
operation against Albanian villages in Serbia hundreds of
thousands of citizens fled south towards Albania and Mace-
donia. Both of these countries had remarkable social, geo-
graphic, economic, and political similarities with the notable
exception of ethnic composition and sociopolitical tolerance
([8], pp. 206, 214). Demographically, Macedonia consisted
of a Slav majority with an Albanian minority and Albania
was a homogeneously Albanian population.
As the crisis intensified and over 300,000 Kosovar Alba-
nian refugees crossed into Macedonia, “ethnic animosity
increased and police and border guards allegedly abused
refugees” inciting refugee retaliation and persistent small-
scale conflicts thereafter ([8], p. 206). Refugees responded
by first organizing a group known as the National Libera-
tion Army (NLA) and then setting demands for the use of
Albanian as “the official state language, a new census, an
Albanian university, and greater influence in national politics”
due to the radical demographic shift ([7], p. 208). Krcmaric
argues the sudden influx of Kosovar Albanians in Macedo-
nia “upset the distribution of latent power and distribution of
benefits between the Slav majority and Albanian minority”
([8], pp. 196, 207) which incited violent group grievance
across the region [14].
Meanwhile, Albania, incurring over 400,000 Kosovar Al-
banian refugees, provided refugees with resources (even
homes) to facilitate the mass migration ([8], p. 212). In
doing so, refugees were reportedly “grateful” and began
looking for work in the region to establish cross national
relationships and solutions for economic and social pros-
perity. His findings suggest Macedonia experienced conflict
because civilians perceived refugee flows to “upset the level
of power between the country’s ethnic groups” ([8], p. 214).
Krcmaric argues this stark contrast in violent or non-violent
outcome is attributable to the ethnic balance of power; In
essence, there was no native group to act on a perceived
threat, whereas the Slav majority in Macedonia feared be-
coming the demographic minority and violently repressed
to maintain economic and political power and the benefits
of such power (e.g. territory or job opportunity).
In sum, existing literature on the connection between
refugees and violent group grievance examines a number
of socio-structural, psychological, and political factors that
may help explain cases where the number of refugees re-
sult in varying degrees of violence. However, there is a
lack of data and systematic analyses to evaluate different
propositions. In this article I examine this question system-
atically; I construct a more developed theoretical framework
incorporating both economic and cultural-based theories
to articulate why I expect the number of refugees to result
in increased violent group grievance. Then I conduct an
analysis that controls for intervening factors.
2.2. Theoretical Framework
In this section, I argue that the connection between the
number of refugees and violent group grievance can partly
be explained by differences in culture (e.g. language or
religion) and/or competition for resources. Violence can
indeed occur between members of the same ethnic group.
However, this does not align with my theoretical framework
to suggest violence results from language or religious ten-
sions amongst members of the same ethnic group (e.g.
Syrians in Germany) since the out-group (i.e. refugees)
collectively share an identity which may violently clash
with the in-group (i.e. native citizens) due to cultural differ-
ences and/or competition for resources. Thus, controlling
for the same/different ethnicity would provide a more vig-
orous test of my claim. This would perhaps even allow the
possibility to distinguish between racial and ethnic effects
also. Due to data limitations, however, my argument that
violent group grievance can partly be explained by differ-
ences in culture remains an assumption since data does
not reveal if refugee groups of a given country, year are of
a certain ethnicity.
I propose the mechanism of social identity and economic
interest theory affects violent group grievance occurring
within a state. Differences between social ethnic groups
may become increasingly significant when one group at-
tempts to violently suppress the other in an effort to protect
resources, way of life, or out of xenophobic tension [15].
Thus, the number of refugees may increase the level of
violent group grievance occurring within a state as differ-
ences amongst the in and out-groups become recognized
and stimulate prejudices capable of turning violent.
Citizens perceiving economic and cultural threats as-
sociated with refugees are more likely to manifest violent
group grievance to avoid the damaging effects of this per-
ceived threat than those who do not, unless the political
regime is capable and willing of effective repression (for
instance Egypt and China).
Sniderman et al. [16] examine the basis of this civil
opposition to immigrant minorities. Their analysis relies on
public opinion survey data collected in The Netherlands
from 1997–1998. Findings suggest that considerations for
national identity “dominate those of economic advantage
which evoke exclusionary policies” and anti-immigrant sen-
timents at large ([16], p. 35). I examine how economic
and cultural factors may result in violence- not just anti-
immigrant sentiments. Scholars such as Rule [5] incorpo-
rate aspects of religion or language into their definition of
culture. My definition of culture includes consideration for
racial (i.e. xenophobic) tension as well.
By incorporating the possibility for cultural (i.e. racial or
ethnic) factors to play a role in addition to economic and
political conditions, we might be able to better understand
why states exhibit violence without resource scarcity. Lake
and Rothchild [17] argued, “ethnic violence is most often
caused by collective fears of the future” ([17], p. 41). They
provide a theoretical link between “collective fears” and eth-
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nic conflict. They argue most ethnic groups coexist quite
harmoniously until “ethnicity is linked with acute social un-
certainty, a history of conflict, and fear of what the future
might bring” ([17], p. 43). As these fears arise “states lose
their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credi-
ble guarantees of protection for groups which as central
authority declines, become fearful for their survival” ([17],
p. 43). This conflict could then begin to manifest as the
masses begin to fear for the safety and struggle to resolve
perceived dilemmas surrounding culture or resources. It is a
distinctly separate condition from a purely economic-driven
assumption to explain why conflict may occur.
In sum, the number of refugees may result in violent
group grievance due to social, political, and economic con-
ditions. I argue that cultural in addition to economic theo-
ries may help us understand the relationship between the
number of refugees and violent group grievance. Specifi-
cally, I rely on the social identity and economic interest the-
ory to examine the relationship between refugee presence
and violent group grievance. I argue that when aspects
of group identities such as ethnicity, language, or religion
are impacted by an increase in immigration, the primary
ethnic group may resist the perceived threat(s) posed by
refugees. This resistance may take the form of violent
means to 1) prevent their national identity and way of life
from being compromised and 2) protect access to scarce
economic resources.
The social identity theory postulates that perceived
threat from conflicting religious values, and opportunity for
misunderstandings based on language or cultural differ-
ences can incite protest participation, panic, even violence
([16], pp. 35–36). The premise of this theory is that indi-
viduals of a society exist, interact, and compete across a
variety of social groups for relative power, resources, and
benefits [18,19]. In this case, natives of a host country
function as the in-group, while refugees may be treated as
the out-group and as a result are targeted for a perceived
threat to in-group way of life and resources.
The social identity theory is an emotion-based ap-
proach to understanding violent group grievance. Pe-
tersen [20] argues that emotion (primarily fear, hatred,
and resentment) is a “mechanism that triggers action to
satisfying a pressing concern” [20], p. 17). He argues
an emotion like fear or hatred “raises the saliency of one
concern over another and heightens cognitive and phys-
ical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational
challenge” [20], p. 17–18). Thus, a native in-group per-
ceiving a threat to aspects of their culture may act on
their negative emotions to preserve their cultural iden-
tity and way of life. According to Petersen [20] violent
group grievance may occur when 1) a structural change
(such as a refugee influx) occurs, 2) the native in-group
perceives a threat, and 3) collectively builds emotions
such as fear, hatred, or resentment-based, then 4) act
on emotions to resist perceived threats to wellbeing (i.e.
cultural integrity or access to resources) ([20], p. 23). To
be clear, he does not propose a mechanism that turns
resentment among the native population into violence. I,
however, argue this mechanism is the perceived threat to
culture and/or resources.
O’Rourke and Sinnott [21] argue non-economic, cul-
tural factors may even be the main drivers of anti-
immigrant and refugee sentiments. They suggest natives
derive utility from “living in a society with a well-defined
sense of national identity and well-understood and ac-
cepted social norms... natives may oppose excessive im-
migration on the grounds that it undermines these norms
with or without disliking foreigners per se” [21], p. 844).
To test these assumptions O’Rourke and Sinnott [21] use
the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
module on national identity. Citizens from 24 countries
were polled from 1995-1996 to determine the level of
anti-immigrant and refugee sentiments. Findings suggest
respondents demonstrated “attitudes towards immigration
reflecting nationalist sentiment”, especially when natives
perceive refugees to have limited skills and subsequent
contribution to their economy ([21], p. 857).
Further, the economic interest theory posits actual or
perceived competition for scarce resources translates into
inter-group conflict [22,23]. Rule [5], Zolberg et al. [7], and
Krcmaric [8] refer to this potential for competition for eco-
nomic resources to incite conflict between social groups
but do not take into account social factors. Specifically, the
social identity argument may help to explain some of the
case anomalies where competition for resources falls short
as an explanation for violent conflict [24–26].
My underlying theoretical assumption then is that citi-
zens of the host country resort to violence in an attempt to
protect 1) existing economic/resource benefits and 2) their
cultural practices and way of life [27]. However, develop-
mental, political, and institutional factors are expected
to mitigate the effects of these inflows on conflict. For
example, economically developed states have policies
such as labor laws and safety nets that serve as an eco-
nomic buffer to “external” influences (such as the number
of refugees) which developing countries often lack ([28],
pp. 29–31, [29], p. 84). Further, democratic regimes
may experience more conflict because of constitutional
protections for freedom of association such as protests,
demonstrations, and institutions that may mobilize sup-
porters based on such identities of culture (e.g. ethnic-
ity or religion). Then again, democracies are based on
greater tolerance of diversity that may result in less vi-
olence. My model controls for level of democracy that
allows for testing of these alternative effects.
With recent conflicts such as that of Syria resulting in
increased refugees, assumptions can be made for aspects
of social competition and potential for cultural clashes to
influence states (particularly developing states) in profound
ways. This research is designed to examine the level of
association between the number of refugees and violent
group grievance. Implications are then derived to tenta-
tively assess the potential value or consequences refugee
influxes pose for the host country.
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3. Research Design and Variable Operationalization
3.1. Dependent Variable
In this study the dependent variable is violent group
grievance. The Fragile States Index (FSI) states that group
grievance is the “tension and violence existing between
social groups and the state’s ability to provide security is
undermined allowing the potential for further fear and vio-
lence” [30]. The Fund for Peace provides this variable by
using quantitative and qualitative analyses to derive a 1 (low
levels of violent grievance) -10 (severe violent grievance)
value for 178 states annually starting in 2015. Low lev-
els of violent group grievance suggest rare and relatively
less-severe occurrences of ethnic violence (e.g. single hate
crime resulting in a single death), where as high level of
violent grievance suggest frequent and severe (i.e. high
morbidity and mortality) acts of ethnic violence (e.g. mass
shootings, persecution, violent repression).
Variable measures comprised within the FSI violent
group grievance variable include discrimination, powerless-
ness, and intrastate violence. More specifically, this mea-
sure of violence captures “ethnic clashes” such as hate
crimes or intrastate conflicts attributable to discrimination
[30]. For example, these violent events must involve ethnic
clashes rather than interpersonal (e.g. relationships) or
criminal (e.g. robbery).
“Ethnic” in this context is used to distinguish between the
dominant national culture and that of incoming refugees [3].
The main independent variable does not distinguish among
ethnic groups. As such, cases that do not have a dominant
culture are included in my analysis; this may be considered
a limitation to this study. The data do not distinguish among
native and refugee ethnic groups. The assumption is that
the dominant native culture and the refugee culture vary.
Further, “group” refers to ethnic groups rather than num-
ber of people. To be clear, a case of a single attacker who
stabs a refugee would be included. In short, this measure
includes all intrastate conflict associated with ethnic vio-
lence, such as ethnic civil wars or demonstrations against
refugees becoming violent, for example.
3.2. Main Independent Variable
The main independent variable refugees is defined as “indi-
viduals forced to flee their country due to persecution, war,
or violence with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
of a particular social group” [1]. The World Bank provides
number of refugees by estimating the refugee population
by country/territory of asylum for 264 states annually from
1960-2014. I use number of refugees in the model (not the
percent of refugees as a percent of the population) due to
the widespread “visibility” of their presence irrespective of
the size of the host state’s population, especially via the
mass media, local and national.
Based on the previously discussed theoretical mech-
anism, I expect pressures associated with the number of
refugees to increase violent conflict. The underlying mech-
anism is citizens may perceive refugees as a threat to re-
sources or culture, rather than contributing members to a
growing workforce, and engage in violence to preserve their
way of life and access to scarce resources. Civil frustration
and ethnic tension may result in hate crimes (i.e. group
grievance) against refugees and small-scale social conflict
capable of contributing to a state’s fragility by means of
unlawful violence. A state quickly ending violence could be
observed as less fragile, but the assumption is that strong
states with governing authority are able to mitigate, prevent,
or deter the majority of these cases.
3.3. Control Variables
The following control variables are included in the model:
1. GDP/Capita
GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided
by midyear population in U.S. currency. World Bank, the
source of these data, operationalize GDP per capita by us-
ing the “sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of the products. Calculations do
not include deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets,
depletion, or degradation of natural resources” [31]. The
expected relationship between GDP/Capita and violent
group grievance is negative, suggesting that an increase in
GDP/capita will result in fewer grievances. The assumption
is that socioeconomic wellbeing for citizens results in more
resources and thus less competition for such resources and
so decreasing the potential for violent grievances.
2. Human Development Index (HDI)
The United Nations Development Programme provides
this variable. Rather than just an economic indicator of
development, this variable measures levels in 1) life ex-
pectancy, 2) education, and 3) income [32]. It is a compos-
ite statistic ranging from zero to one. Higher ratings indicate
higher levels of human development.
I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in de-
veloping compared to developed states. In less developed
countries (LDCs) where citizens may face higher unem-
ployment levels and struggle to secure a living, they may
be more vulnerable economically and thus more likely to
compete for already limited resources for survival. In LDCs
refugees consuming scarce resources may be more likely
to trigger violence by citizens against perceived contrib-
utors to economic hardship. In developed states where
resources are relatively less scarce and thus competition
for resources lower, lower levels of violent group grievance
are expected. Further, I assume that increases in hu-
man development address certain grievances (such as
economic hardship), whereas lower levels of human de-
velopment may be associated with competition for scarce
resources leading to violence.
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3. Democracy
I utilize two indicators to capture democracy. First, the
Polity IV Project provides data on the level of democracy
for 167 countries from 1946-2015. The values range from
Autocracy (-10) to Full Democracy (10). Second, the World
Bank created a “Voice and Accountability” variable to cap-
ture perceptions of the “extent to which citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well as free-
dom of expression, association, and a free media” [31]. This
variable has a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country,
year. Lower values signify weaker democracy, while higher
values signify stronger democracy in relation to the vari-
able description above. The two indicators are correlated
at 0.8395, but there is no multicollinearity to affect tests of
statistical significance.
Democracies often permit citizens (through constitutions
or political doctrine) to participate in public protests and
demonstrations, which have the potential to turn violent as
grievances are aired. Protest demonstrations and alterna-
tive institutional arrangements (e.g. political parties and
organizations) may be largely suppressed in autocracies,
thus less violent group grievance would be expected. How-
ever, democratic institutions are channels for the expression
for citizen grievances so it may be argued that less violence
is likely in democracies than in autocratic regimes. Thus,
democracy may be associated positively of negatively with
violent group conflict.
I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in
democratic compared to autocratic states. In democracies
constitutional protections exist for citizens to have the right
to participate in public protests and demonstrations, which
have the potential to turn violent as grievances are aired.
Protest demonstrations and alternative institutional arrange-
ments (e.g. political parties and organizations) may be
largely suppressed in autocracies, thus less violent group
grievance would be expected. On the other hand, however,
democratic institutions are channels for the expression for
citizen grievances so it may be argued that less violence is
likely in democracies than in autocratic regimes. For exam-
ple, citizens in a democracy may use the vote to act on their
underlying grievances whereas citizens in autocracies or
authoritarian political systems are not able to participate in
elections and therefore may take it upon themselves to act
on their grievances against perceived threats. Therefore,
although I expect higher levels of violent group grievance
in democracies than autocracies, the effect may be in the
opposite direction.
4. Control of Corruption
This variable, a Worldwide Governance Indicator, is op-
erationalized as the perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain. Control of Corruption
also has a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year.
Similarly, lower values signify weaker control of corruption,
while higher values signify stronger control of corruption in
relation to the variable description.
I expect the relationship between control of corruption
and group grievance to be negative, suggesting that a
government’s inability to control corruption results in an
increase in violent group grievance. This may be due to the
allocation of resources to address pressures resulting from
the number of refugees. States that have greater control
of corruption may allocate such resources more effectively
(addressing refugees’ needs and citizens’ grievances) thus
containing the level of violence compared to states that
have less control of corruption.
5. Political Stability
The World Bank operationalizes Political Stability as
the perceptions of the likelihood of politically motivated vi-
olence, including acts of terrorism. This measure of politi-
cally motivated violence includes acts of state-sponsored
and non-state group acts of terrorism. Non-state group
acts of terrorism are included only if the attack was com-
mitted to advance a political cause. By this definition,
I expect the relationship between political stability and
violent group grievance to be negative, suggesting that a
government capable of inflicting or permitting politically-
motivated violence on its citizens to also be capable of
repressing citizens from committing acts of violent group
grievance.
This Worldwide Governance Indicator also has a range
from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Lower values
signify weaker stability, while higher values signify stronger
stability in relation to the variable description above.
6. Population Size
The World Bank contains a variable indicator of pop-
ulation size for country-year, defined operationally as the
number of residents of the state regardless of legal sta-
tus/citizenship [31]. I anticipate a positive relationship be-
tween population size and grievance, suggesting that in
states with larger populations the opportunity for violence
may be larger than in countries with smaller populations.
On the other hand, larger states are better equipped to
deal with refugees and might also be more diverse, thus
lessening the cultural threat perception.
3.4. Data and Empirical Strategy
The unit of analysis for this research design is Country, Year.
The sample is 178 countries from 2006-2014. This time-
frame is attributable to data restriction since The Fragile
States Index started in 2005 and thus in the most recent
decade data in regard to refugees has become more robust
and available to the public.
Furthermore, I use a one-year lag for both develop-
ment (HDI) and control of corruption since grievances
associated with either would likely take time to mani-
fest. I estimate the effects using a Driscoll-Kraay XT
Regression that corrects for heteroskedasticity. I use a
cross-sectional longitudinal (XT) model with fixed effects
to assess the relationship between refugee pressures
and violent group grievance.
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H1 I expect a positive relationship between the number of
refugees and violent group grievance.
H2 I expect a negative relationship between GDP/Capita
and violent group grievance.
H3 I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in de-
veloping compared to developed states.
H4 I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in demo-
cratic compared to autocratic states.
H5 I expect a negative relationship between control of cor-
ruption and violent group grievance.
H6 I expect a negative relationship between political stabil-
ity and violent group grievance.
H7 I expect a positive relationship between population size
and violent group grievance.
4. Results and Analysis
Table 1 shows the effect of the number of refugees on vi-
olent group grievance is statistically significant and in the
anticipated direction.
The regression results indicate that as refugee pres-
sures increase, group grievance also increases by 5.00e-07
on average [33]. To illustrate, an increase in refugees from
100,000 to 200,000 results in an increase of .05 in the in-
dex of violent group grievance (a scale from 1 to 10). This
finding confirms the main hypothesis of this study on the
effect of refugee pressures on violent group grievance.
The effect on the dependent variable is shown in Figure
1, which shows the statistically significant, positive rela-
tionship between number of refugees and violent group
grievance. Predicted values of violent group grievance as
numbers of refugees increase from zero to three million are
shown on the Y-axis of Figure 1.
As this figure indicates, high numbers of refugees are
not always “necessary” for a state to experience mid-to-high
degrees of violent grievance capable of impacting fragility
[34]. This finding suggests that number of refugees is an im-
portant determinant of state fragility. As such, the inclusion
of refugees belongs in the security studies literature.
All control variables are statistically significant. However,
four coefficients are not in the direction expected. First,
the relationship between GDP/capita and violent group
grievance is positive; suggesting increased GDP/capita re-
sults in more violent group grievance. This finding appears
to be reinforcing the argument made by Sniderman et al.
[16] that cultural factors may account for violent conflict even
in circumstances where there is relative economic prosper-
ity. However, the unanticipated negative effect needs to be
investigated further. To be sure, GDP/per capita is not an in-
dicator of wealth distribution, or level of economic inequality
that may be a better predictor of violent group grievance.
Second, the relationship between HDI and violent group
grievance is also positive. While contrary to initial expec-
tation, the finding mirrors that of GDP/capita therefore not
surprising. This finding suggests that an increase in devel-
opment in terms of education, longevity, and income also
results in increased violent group grievance. This may be
attributable to civilians violently resisting perceived threats
from the number of refugees to protect current benefits
associated with development.
Third, the relationship between voice and accountabil-
ity and violent group grievance is positive, suggesting
that an increase of freedom of expression, association,
and free media is associated with an increase in violent
grievance. This may suggest the freedom to express
grievances has potential to turn violent (e.g. protests
resulting into riots).
Lastly, the relationship between level of democ-
racy and violent group grievance is positive, suggest-
ing that increased democracy results in more violent
group grievance. The rationale may reside in autocratic
elites being able to effectively oppress citizen opposition
and violence before violent group grievances increase.
In contrast, democratic states permitting expression of
grievances (e.g. protests) may indirectly permit increased
opportunity for violence to erupt.
Because of the unexpected directions of these coeffi-
cients, I test for multicollinearity to determine potentially
highly collinear measures amongst the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Voice and accountability, control of cor-
ruption, and political stability were highly correlated, but
further testing revealed that controlling for this collinearity
did not affect the statistical significance or direction of
any variables.
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Table 1. Refugees and violent group grievance Driscoll-Kraay (DV) XT regression with fixed effects.
Independent variables Coefficient SE P>|t|
Refugees 5.00 × 10−7 7.62 × 10−8 0
GDP/Capita 0.00002 6.07 × 10−6 0.002
L.Human Development 4.7656 0.955 0
Voice & Accountability 0.2508 0.0735 0.001
L.Control of Corruption −0.3692 0.1535 0.017
Stability −0.2589 0.0301 0
Level of Democracy 0.0234 0.0099 0.02
Population (logged) −0.9441 0.2926 0.002
Constant 17.6796 4.3565 0
Prob>F 0
Within R-Squared 0.0986
N (observations) 1146
Figure 1. Refugees and violent group grievance.
5. Limitations and Conclusion
This research examines the relationship between the num-
ber of refugees and violent group grievance. The main
hypothesis in this study was confirmed while controlling for
a variety of factors associated with violent group grievance
as an indicator of state fragility’s dimension of authority.
This first large-N quantitative analysis is consistent with
findings in the literature that number of refugees result in
increased violent group grievance. I argue the theoretical
mechanism for this relationship to be social competition for
resources and preservation of cultural identity.
In conclusion, states experiencing economic or cultural
pressures associated with refugees may experience in-
creased violent group grievance and thus increased fragility.
My findings imply that richer, democratic states are more
fragile in this context than less developed, autocratic states.
This contradicts assumptions in the literature on fragile
states suggesting rich democracies are often less frag-
ile than poor developing countries [36]. Improving data
and exploring other potential determinants of violent group
grievance may help researchers to better understand the
mechanism and dynamics of this association.
Now, a limitation of this study is that violent group
grievance does not distinguish empirically between violence
against refugees and that against immigrants. Rather, the
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measure captures ethnic violence, specifically hate crimes
and conflicts attributable to discrimination. Such violence,
to be sure, may include acts of violence committed against
immigrants; however, it is not possible to deconstruct this
index since each value of this variable is based on quan-
titative and qualitative data I do not have access to. To
account in part for this limitation I attempted to locate data
on the number of immigrants to include it in the analysis as
a control variable. However, such data were not available
for the cases and years included in my study.
Another limitation of this study is that I assume that each
country in the data sample has a “dominant” culture that is
different from that of the refugees. Refugees that have the
same culture as that of the dominant group or a group in
the host state may experience less violent group grievance;
but I do not test for this effect.
Lastly, I incorporate a variety of economic (e.g.
GDP/capita), social (e.g. human development, democracy),
political (e.g. corruption, stability) and demographic (e.g.
population size) variables to examine the relationship be-
tween the number of refugees and violent group grievance.
However, I am unable to test certain cultural factors (e.g.
language differences) across all countries due to data and
empirical limitations. For example, I do not examine ev-
ery refugee group’s relationship with all other countries
(e.g. Syrian refugees in every host country outside of Syria
with consideration for language differences), which deviates
heavily from an exploratory study on violent group grievance
to less-related aspects outside this study’s analytical scope.
This large-N quantitative analysis is meant to provide an
overall interpretation of the number of refugees and violent
group grievance with available data.
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